A.A. Gromyko and Security Policy: Clash of Tactics on the Way to Belgrade

The article continues the study of the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko in the formation, development and maintenance of security policy, its principles and structural elements. The scientific subject of the article is the comparison of the conceptual tactics of A.A. Gromyko and the situational tactics of Western countries in the run-up to the preparation of the Belgrade meeting of the CSCE states in 1977. The article consists of three parts. In the first part, the author analyzes the conceptual tactics of A.A. Gromyko and proves that the Soviet Foreign Minister sought a non-aligned status for the CSCE. A.A. Gromyko wanted the CSCE states to work together and effectively on key international problems. The second part presents the West's situational tactics. The author shows that by middle of 1977, the Western countries did not have a unified position regarding the CSCE. Therefore, their own consolidation and their own unified appearance played a much greater role for these countries than the serious analysis of Soviet proposals. In the third part, the question is raised for the first time in historiography whether the two unrelated tactics can influence the future potential of an international organization and the opinion of the political elite. The author recommends taking into account the proposals of A.A. Gromyko in the modern system of international relations. The sources of the article are published documents of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, the use of which can be explained methodologically. It was important for the author to conduct the analysis on the basis of the foreign partners' assessment of the statements made by the Soviet Foreign Minister during official negotiations (outer reflection). The author's reasoning should be understood in the context of his earlier article in this journal.