Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Transparency and Denial as Complementary Approaches

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) remains a cornerstone of international disarmament but faces persistent challenges due to the absence of a verification regime and the dual-use nature of biological research. This article examines how denial-based approaches – focused on resilience, surveillance, and biodefense preparedness – can strengthen the BWC while preserving its normative foundations. Traditional punitive responses remain problematic in the biological domain due to attribution difficulties and legal constraints, whereas denial-focused measures offer more practical and credible pathways to reducing the incentives and opportunities for misuse. However, these measures risk generating suspicion unless paired with robust transparency practices. Drawing on historical, legal, and policy developments, the article argues for a balanced framework that integrates denial-based approaches with modernized confidence-building measures, voluntary peer reviews, and open-source transparency tools. This combination strengthens collective assurance of peaceful intent while respecting necessary strategic ambiguity. The article concludes with policy recommendations aimed at revitalizing the BWC through technical innovation, institutional adaptation, and cooperative transparency, ensuring the regime remains effective amid evolving biological risks.