Philosophy and Common Sense Knowledge

Abstract In this paper, I discuss Rescher's view of the relationship between common sense knowledge and philosophy and his defense of the demands of common sense. In the first three sections, I summarize his account of common sense beliefs, his views on the practical nature of common sense beliefs and its relevance to their authority, and his views on the relationship between common sense and philosophy. In the last three sections, I discuss his views critically. I argue that Rescher is mistaken in claiming that common sense can only exercise a veto over philosophical views, and that our common sense beliefs can be “legitimated” by “cultural selection.” Finally, Rescher suggests that the pragmatic character of common sense belief and knowledge distinguishes them from “merely common” belief and knowledge, and suggests that common sense beliefs and knowledge are widely held because they are practical. I raise some doubts about the pragmatic character of some common sense beliefs, and suggest an alternative explanation for their being widely held.