Contemporary debates across philosophy, science, media studies, and technology are increasingly characterized by conflicts over what is considered real. These conflicts are often framed as disputes between realism and relativism, objectivity and construction, facts and narratives. This paper argues that such oppositions obscure a more fundamental problem: the absence of a coherent framework for differentiating modes and degrees of reality. The Relative Reality Theory (RRT) proposes a systematic account of reality as a graded and context-dependent status rather than an absolute property. Reality is understood as a function of experiential immediacy, intersubjective stability, and functional effectiveness. On this basis, the theory distinguishes subjective, intersubjective, and functional reality domains without collapsing them into a single ontological hierarchy or reducing them to mere opinion. RRT offers a conceptual framework for analyzing scientific models, media realities, political narratives, simulations, and virtual environments. By clarifying the conditions under which something can be considered real in a specific sense, the theory avoids both ontological absolutism and arbitrary relativism. It provides tools for identifying category errors, reframing apparent reality conflicts, and explaining why certain realities remain stable despite contestation. The paper positions RRT as a philosophical ordering framework rather than an operational or technical theory. Its aim is not to compute or optimize reality claims, but to clarify their scope, limits, and validity. In doing so, RRT contributes to contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science by offering a precise language for navigating reality under conditions of pluralism, mediation, and systemic complexity.
Stefan Rapp (Sat,) studied this question.