Erotetic Ignorance, Propositional Ignorance, and Questions of Significance. Reply to Christopher Willard‐Kyle

In his reply to my book Ignorance: A Philosophical Study , Christopher Willard‐Kyle zooms in on erotetic ignorance and the Significance Condition of my account of ignorance. Erotetic ignorance is lacking the answers to certain questions when the question is sound and when there is an answer to the question. Willard‐Kyle shows that my arguments for the idea that erotetic ignorance reduces to propositional ignorance are wanting. In this response, I address each of his concerns about this claim and also my earlier suggestion that an account of ignorance needs to take a Significance Condition on board. I argue that my thesis that erotetic ignorance reduces to propositional ignorance was, thus put, indeed too crude and Willard‐Kyle's sharp arguments and convincing examples made me see that. However, a refined and more complex version of the thesis can meet his worries.