This article critiques the belief in theory-neutral methods in consciousness science, highlighting its implications.
This article challenges the assumption that the science of consciousness can proceed from a theory-neutral foundation. I argue that even ostensibly theory-neutral (or theory-light) programmes inevitably rely on substantive background commitments that cannot be cleanly bracketed. The analysis demonstrates that the aspiration to eliminate or minimize theory-dependence in favour of pure observation risks collapsing into naïve empiricism. More broadly, the paper contends that there is no context-independent scientific method—certainly not one that seeks to purge theoretical commitments from the neuroscience of consciousness without significant epistemic cost.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Majid Davoody Beni (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: