Contemporary consciousness research encompasses a wide range of empirical theories and philosophical positions, yet no generally accepted explanatory framework has emerged that integrates the different aspects of conscious experience. This paper examines the extent to which persistent controversies in the field arise not only from unresolved empirical questions but also from differences in the conceptual, methodological, and ontological assumptions underlying competing research approaches. To this end, major empirical theories of consciousness are examined in relation to central scientific controversies and philosophical positions. Through a comparative theoretical analysis, recurring tensions between different levels of explanation are identified and systematized in an axis- based synthesis.The analysis identifies six central areas of tension: the localization and distributed organization of consciousness; the relationship between physical reduction and non-reductive ontologies; functional explanation and phenomenal experience; empirical accessibility and ontological scope; reduction and theoretical overreach; and operationalization and conceptual inconsistency. These areas of tension are interconnected but concern distinct types of scientific and philosophical questions. The paper argues that the theoretical fragmentation of consciousness research cannot be adequately assessed without considering not only empirical differences but also the concepts, explanatory levels, and epistemic assumptions underlying different approaches. The findings do not establish that existing controversies are inherently irresolvable. Rather, they highlight the need to distinguish systematically between empirical, conceptual, and ontological questions while examining how these dimensions relate to one another.
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Brandt et al. (2026) studied this question.
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