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Review examines contemporary theories of consciousness, evaluating empirical support and implications.
Understanding consciousness remains one of the most significant challenges in neuroscience, philosophy, and cognitive science. Despite substantial advances in neuroimaging, electrophysiology, and computational modeling, a comprehensive account of the neural basis of conscious experience has yet to emerge. This review examines several leading contemporary theories of consciousness, including the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT), Dendritic Integration Theory (DIT), Predictive Processing (PP), and the Memory Theory of Consciousness (MToC). The philosophical foundations, core theoretical claims, and empirical evidence supporting each framework are critically evaluated. Particular attention is given to how these theories address phenomenal consciousness—the subjective quality of experience—and access consciousness—the availability of information for cognitive control, report, and behavior. By comparing convergent and divergent predictions across theoretical perspectives, this review highlights key areas of agreement, ongoing debates, and unresolved questions in the field. The analysis suggests that consciousness is likely to involve multiple interacting neural mechanisms operating across different spatial and temporal scales, underscoring the need for continued interdisciplinary research to advance a more comprehensive understanding of conscious experience.
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Arosh S. Perera Molligoda Arachchige (2026) studied this question.
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