ABSTRACT Thomas Kelly and Stuart Cohen argue that intuitions about rationality provide a direct argument against the pragmatist's claim that there are practical reasons for and against belief. Although Susanna Rinard offers an insightful response to their “Rationality Argument” on behalf of robust pragmatism (the view that there are only practical reasons for and against belief), this article offers a response to the argument on behalf of pluralist pragmatism (the view that there are both practical and epistemic reasons for and against belief). I argue that contrary to what Kelly and Cohen claim, the pluralist pragmatist may adopt the very same view of rationality and all the same intuitive verdicts about cases as the anti‐pragmatist. So, intuitions about rationality can't be wielded as an argument against pluralist pragmatism. Moreover, I argue that even if the pluralist pragmatist adopts a different view of rationality than the anti‐pragmatist, they can still accommodate Kelly and Cohen's intuitions about the sorts of cases they appeal to. So, no matter which view of rationality the pluralist pragmatist accepts, Kelly and Cohen's Rationality Argument fails.
Stephanie Leary (Sun,) studied this question.