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Courts analyze AI as legal entities, implying significant consequences for developers and users.
Courts are beginning to treat AI systems as legal actors without any doctrinal framework granting them that status. This shift is not deliberate. It is a structural drift—a gradual migration of language and assumptions that reclassifies a tool as a "third party," with all the liabilities that label carries. In United States v. Heppner, No. 25-cr-00503-JSR (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2026), Judge Rakoff referred to a commercial AI system as a "third-party" recipient of user communications, treating the interaction as a disclosure rather than a drafting act. This paper argues that such language constitutes a category error with cascading consequences. If applied consistently, the same logic would classify every cloud-mediated drafting environment—from Google Docs to Microsoft Teams—as a third-party recipient of privileged information. Courts have never taken that position. The inconsistency reveals a drift toward treating AI as a quasi-person: absorbing the liabilities of personhood without bearing any of its responsibilities. The collateral damage falls on developers, ordinary users, and organizations—not on the AI systems being misclassified. This paper examines the mechanism of the drift, its structural consequences, and proposes a coherence test grounded in transmission surface, control plane, and continuity of intent rather than substrate identity.
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Narnaiezzsshaa Truong (2026) studied this question.
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