This paper examines Kant?s pre-critical argument from possibility, developed in The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763). In this work, Kant attempts to establish the existence of a necessary being on the basis of the very concept of internal possibility-conceivability without contradiction. The argument is based on a distinction between the formal element of possibility, grounded in the principle of non-contradiction, and the material element, which requires actual existence as a condition for anything to be thinkable. Without this material element, Kant argues, all possibility would be abolished. Since contingent beings cannot provide such a foundation, he concludes that a necessary being must exist as the ground of all internal possibility. The paper offers a systematic reconstruction of the argument and reassesses its philosophical significance. It argues that Kant?s early account of the relation between possibility and existence anticipates key problems that reappear-transformed-in his critical philosophy. In this way, the argument from possibility merits renewed attention, not merely as a historical curiosity, but as a significant step in the broader trajectory of Kant?s metaphysical development.
Radenko Gurdeljevic (Thu,) studied this question.