Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
The analysis reveals that lower stock liquidity increases voluntary delisting likelihood in firms, highlighting financial market monitoring's role.
Our study attempts to introduce a model of voluntary delisting based on firms’ borrowing capacity. In this model, we propose that a listed firm’s borrowing capacity exceeds that of a private firm only if the advantages of reduced private benefits offset the associated listing costs. We further argue that private benefits depend on the quality of financial market monitoring, which in turn is conditioned by the liquidity of a firm’s stock. Theoretical propositions were tested on a sample of 5, 526 U.S. firms from 1990 to 2020. Our estimates suggest that the lower a firm’s stock liquidity, the more likely a firm is to delist voluntarily, underscoring the critical role played by financial market monitoring in determining listing status. The implications of our results for both theory and practice are discussed.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
D’Ecclesia et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: