This essay examines gene editing's ethical implications, defending dignity in light of emerging biotechnologies.
This essay offers a philosophical and bioethical upholding of Dignitas Personae §27, which cautions against the use of human gene editing (HGE) for non-therapeutic purposes. After situating the debate within the historical development of gene-editing technologies, the essay classifies enhancement-oriented interventions—physical, behavioral, and cognitive—and argues that such practices risk violating human dignity, diminishing authentic freedom, and promoting a deterministic anthropology. Drawing on a personalist framework, the analysis incorporates insights from neuroscience, genetics, and natural law. In the second part, the essay examines Aristotelian–Thomistic metaphysics, integrating Ernest Mayr’s notion of teleonomy to explain how the rational soul actualizes its perfect operations. It is argued that non-therapeutic HGE, especially germline modifications, may disrupt the ontological structure of the human person by impairing the soul’s expression through properly disposed prime matter. Ultimately, Dignitas Personae stands as a coherent and prescient response to emerging biotechnologies, defending the human person against technocratic reductionism and the ideological drive to transcend our embodied finitude.
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Castaldi et al. (2026) studied this question.
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