Philosophical analysis critiques germline editing ethics, proposing a framework for genetic justice.
This paper examines the ethical relationship between human germline editing and human dignity from Ronald Dworkin’s philosophical perspective. The moral stalemate in current bioethical discourse, where conflicting accounts of dignity fail to provide a clear permissibility status for genetic interventions, is the central problem addressed. The objectives of this paper are twofold: first, to critique the limitations of genetic essentialism that views the human genome as an untouchable relic, and second, to propose a normative framework grounded in Ronald Dworkin’s principles of self-respect and dignity. Using conceptual analysis, critical evaluation of existing bioethical arguments, and philosophical interpretation of Dworkin’s works, particularly Life’s Dominion and Justice for Hedgehogs, the paper argues that therapeutic germline editing aimed at preventing serious hereditary suffering is morally compatible with human dignity. However, enhancement-oriented genetic manipulation may threaten human dignity by encouraging instrumentalization, perfectionism, and the conditional standardization of human worth. The study concludes by offering a realistic integrated ethical framework that prioritizes therapeutic imperatives while establishing a firm boundary against enhancement and recommending practical pathways for ensuring genetic justice and moral governance
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Ishaya et al. (2026) studied this question.
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