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March 14, 2026Biological Theory2 citationsOpen Access

The Force of Experience: A Biophysical Hypothesis of a Confined Interaction in Living Neural Systems

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FSFredric Schiffer

Key Points

  • This research explores how subjective experience can exert a real force on neural structures and functions.
  • Introduced the concept of the force of experience as a physical force in living neural systems.
  • Compared the proposed force to physical concepts like biological confinement and strong nuclear interaction.
  • Examined how experience affects activation barriers of neural logic gates within the brain.
  • The force of experience acts on structured biological information in the brain.
  • Experience biases activation barriers, affecting metabolic potential release.
  • Suggests a novel view of experience as essential for biological agency and mental causation.

Abstract

Abstract Standard physicalism often renders subjective experience epiphenomenal, while interactionist accounts struggle to reconcile mental causation with energy conservation. We propose the force of experience : a real, physically efficacious force exerted by experience on neural architecture. To address the objection that a fundamental force should act universally, we introduce biological confinement, analogous to the confinement of the strong nuclear interaction. The force of experience acts exclusively on structured biological information—the coherent, meaning-bearing informational patterns sustained within the living brain. Within the brain’s open thermodynamic system, experience supplies the causal influence required to bias activation barriers of neural logic gates, releasing stored metabolic potential in a direction determined by the meaning of the experience and the organism’s prior experiential history. This framework reconceives subjective experience as a confined physical force essential for biological agency and clarifies how meaning-driven interactions can be both constructive and destructive. We situate this proposal within historical perspectives on mental causation, including agential realism, dispositional causation, and nonreductive materialist psychology, while offering a biophysical mechanism absent from prior accounts.

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Cite This Study

Fredric Schiffer (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/69b4ba0818185d8a3980282dhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-026-00534-x
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