This study examines Kuwait’s relations with both the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from 1961 to 1990, within the broader context of the Cold War and the division of Europe. Grounded in small state theory and drawing on theoretical frameworks of hedging strategies, economic statecraft, and strategic neutrality, the study analyzes how Kuwait pursued a balanced foreign policy toward the two Germanies—combining strategic neutrality with economic openness—while deliberately avoiding alignment with either bloc. Relations with the FRG were characterized by full diplomatic recognition and robust cooperation in trade and technical fields, whereas ties with the GDR remained limited and largely symbolic. Drawing on archival records, trade statistics, and diplomatic sources, the study demonstrates how Kuwait’s foreign policy exemplifies key theoretical frameworks of small-state behavior, including hedging strategies and economic statecraft that consistently prioritize national interests, while strategically employing ideological rhetoric when necessary. It further offers an analytical reflection on how this historical experience continues to shape Gulf foreign policy today, suggesting that the balancing strategies adopted by small states like Kuwait during the Cold War remain theoretically and practically relevant amid the evolving dynamics of the contemporary international order.
H. S. Shalabi (Mon,) studied this question.