This article empirically investigates the fundamental reorientation of Germany’s foreign policy from a normative, trade-centric ‘civilian power’ to a pragmatic ‘strategic hedger’ in response to a fragmenting global order. To bridge the gap between political rhetoric and actual state behaviour, the study introduces an original large-N dataset tracking official international bilateral visits by German Chancellors from 1991 to 2023. By utilising logit regression models to analyse the spatial allocation of these visits, the research identifies a profound structural behavioural break following the 2013/2014 ‘Munich Consensus’. Prior to 2013, a benign unipolar environment allowed German diplomacy to be driven primarily by geo-economic export interests and domestic normative values, such as human rights. However, post-2013, amidst rising multipolarity and declining U.S. hegemonic reliability, diplomatic visits shifted decisively towards global diversification. Target state military capacity emerged as a significant independent predictor of visits, while UN General Assembly voting similarity with the U.S. negatively correlated with visits. Ultimately, the findings demonstrate that the 2022 Zeitenwende is not a sudden departure, but rather the acceleration of a decade-long strategy of systemic hedging.
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Aras et al. (2026) studied this question.
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