Low-Carbon Production Strategies of Manufacturing Firms Under Free-Riding and Technology Spillovers: A Moran Process Analysis

Against the backdrop of China’s dual-carbon goals and the global green transition, low-carbon production in the manufacturing sector is crucial to achieving high-quality development. Based on the dual mechanisms of the free-riding effect and technology spillovers, this paper develops a Moran stochastic evolutionary game model of manufacturing firms’ low-carbon production strategies under government regulation. We analyze the dynamic evolution and stability of low-carbon versus conventional production strategies under strong- and weak-selection conditions. The results show that under strong selection, a low free-riding payoff promotes the diffusion of the low-carbon strategy and the formation of a stable equilibrium; a moderate free-riding payoff makes population size the key factor shaping evolutionary outcomes; and a high free-riding payoff leads the system to degenerate into a steady state dominated by conventional production. Under weak selection, government subsidies and fines increase the fixation probability and stability of the low-carbon strategy, whereas excessive free-riding payoffs undermine the persistence of the transition. Numerical simulations validate the theoretical analysis and indicate that government regulation, technology spillovers, and population structure jointly shape the long-term evolution of low-carbon behavior, providing a theoretical basis and decision-making reference for optimizing policy mechanisms and promoting the low-carbon transition of the manufacturing sector.