Decoding Legislative Dynamics: Empirics on Bill Modifications in China

Authoritarian legislatures are often portrayed as “rubber stamps” that merely formalize predetermined decisions. Yet growing evidence suggests that they can influence policy through deliberation and bill modification. This study investigates legislative modification in China’s National People’s Congress. Drawing on an original dataset of 133 bill–law pairs enacted between 2008 and 2023, we employ an improved minimum edit-distance algorithm to quantify textual change and identify conditions that generate more extensive modification. Results reveal that Congress has become proactive in shaping legislative outcomes. Party attention and public concern significantly amplify modification, whereas bureaucratic fragmentation constrains it. A qualitative case study of the Food Safety Law illustrates how bureaucratic competition creates drafting ambiguity, while public concern weakens departmental interests and facilitates consensus. These findings demonstrate that bill modification functions as a mechanism of controlled coordination that reconciles party priorities, societal pressures, and bureaucratic fragmentation within a centralized authoritarian policymaking system.