Understanding‐Grounded Self‐Knowledge: A Rational Agency Account

This essay argues for a rational agency account of transparent self‐knowledge. I argue that self‐knowledge, the second‐order knowledge of one's intentional and cognitive mental states, is grounded on one's first‐order understanding of the relevant world‐oriented question. My account improves on the previous transparency theories developed by Richard Moran and others in three respects: (1) it accounts for the epistemic warrant of transparent self‐knowledge missing from Moran's view; (2) it extends to self‐knowledge of other rational beliefs, whereas most existing theories only apply to deliberation‐based self‐knowledge; (3) it avoids the charge of “voluntarism” since it does not postulate a rational capacity of “deciding what to believe.” My account also comes with far‐reaching implications. Most importantly, it will be the upshot of my argument that second‐order self‐knowledge is constitutive of the very first‐order understanding of the world. Moreover, I suggest that at least in the paradigmatic cases, self‐knowledge is primarily about one's understanding and knowledge, instead about rather than one's belief, as scholars have commonly assumed.