Abstract In this article we argue that the question of ‘the good life’ is an important psychological question that is an implicit part of psychological practice, but that is mainly approached explicitly from the perspective of positivity in psychological theory. We argue that this approach falls short in understanding and dealing with the otherness that constitutes human existence. Instead, we turn to Hegelian dialectics and negativity and suggest that Kierkegaard and Lacan offer a philosophical anthropology and ethics that most consistently takes the otherness of existence seriously. We show how Kierkegaard and Lacan understand the human being as constituted by otherness, how this means the human being is constitutively in an existential state of alienation, lack and despair, how this state is nonetheless obscured and enjoyed, and ultimately how the human being can alternatively confront otherness dialectically and precariously in a practice of the good life characterized by continuous negative existential work. Finally, we raise the questions of the possibility of a negative psychology and its potential for integration with social theory.
Motlagh et al. (Sat,) studied this question.