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Theoretical model demonstrates the interplay between subjective and objective metrics in incentive contracts, highlighting when explicit terms crowd out or complement relational agreements.
Incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in (respectively) implicit and explicit incentive contracts. We show that the presence of sufficiently effective explicit contracts can render all implicit contracts infeasible, even those that would otherwise yield the first-best. We also show, however, that in some circumstances objective and subjective measures are complements: neither an explicit nor an implicit contract alone yields positive profit, but an appropriate combination of the two does. Finally, we consider subjective weights on objective measures.
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Baker et al. (1994) studied this question.
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