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We present a two‐period model of remanufacturing in the face of competition. In our model, an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) competes with a local remanufacturer (L) under many reverse logistics configurations for the returned items. After establishing the Nash Equilibrium in the second period sub‐game, we use numerical experiments for comparative statics. OEM wants to increase L'S remanufacturing cost. Surprisingly, while L competes in the sales market, she has incentives to reduce oem's remanufacturing cost. A social planner who wants to increase remanufacturing can give incentives to the OEM to increase the fraction available for remanufacturing, or reduce his remanufacturing costs.
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Majumder et al. (2001) studied this question.
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