Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model of Industry–University–Research Collaborative Innovation of New Energy Vehicles

The development of new energy vehicles (NEVs) is key to the green and high-quality upgrading of China’s automotive industry, with the penetration rate of domestic NEV passenger cars exceeding 50%. However, deepening industry–university–research (IUR) collaborative innovation to break core technological bottlenecks remains a critical challenge. To address the limitations of existing studies—mostly focusing on dyadic interactions or hypothetical numerical simulations—this study constructs a novel tripartite evolutionary game model of NEV enterprises, university–research institutions, and the government, fully incorporating the industry’s unique attributes of high technological complexity, industrial integration, and innovation risk. Innovatively, we calibrate and verify the model using actual operation data from the Yancheng Institute of Technology–Yueda New Energy Vehicle College, bridging the gap between traditional theoretical simulation and industrial practice. The quantitative findings show that: a 40–60% balanced benefit distribution and matching cost-sharing mechanism are the core conditions for the system to reach an evolutionarily stable state; when the achievement transformation coefficient exceeds 50%, the convergence rate of stable cooperation willingness between both parties increases by over 40%; a moderate government subsidy intensity of 55% effectively accelerates the system’s positive evolution, with the incentive effect of subsidies diminishing rapidly in the mature collaboration stage; and robust collaborative innovation technology can reduce government intervention demand by more than 60%. This study enriches the theory of NEV IUR collaborative innovation, breaks the limitations of traditional research frameworks, and provides actionable references for promoting the high-quality development of the NEV industry.