Argues that credences relate to probability beliefs, indicating an underlying principle for rational thought.
Much has been said about the relation between credences and beliefs. Surprisingly little, however, has been said about how credences more specifically relate to probability beliefs. In this paper, I will argue that they are normatively related. This proposal goes against belief‐first reductionism, which says that credences just are probability beliefs. Against the most popular version of this view, I will offer a novel counterexample in which intuitively there is an irrational subject with mismatching credences and probability beliefs. Such cases motivate what I call the Interdoxastic Coordination Principle (ICP), according to which a subject is epistemically rational only if (roughly put) her credences and her beliefs' epistemically probabilistic contents match. I will show that ICP gets right various data points about the interplay between credences and probability beliefs.
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Roman Heil (2026) studied this question.
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