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This paper argues that Spinoza's definition of causa sui at the opening of the Ethics is a deliberate rejection of creationism. While most interpretations focus on whether causa sui expresses formal or efficient causation, they overlook the theological force of Spinoza's opening move. I suggest that the first definition—‘that whose essence involves existence’—mirrors and inverts Genesis 1:1, where Scripture begins with divine creation; Spinoza begins with self‐causation, replacing will and temporal beginning with necessity and eternity. Tracing the role of causa sui through Part I of the Ethics and culminating in the Appendix, I show that Spinoza systematically eliminates the conceptual basis of creation. If God is self‐caused, divine causation cannot be temporal or purposive. The critique of teleology and anthropomorphism follows directly from this shift. Reading causa sui against Genesis thus reveals a systematic connection between Spinoza's rejection of creationism and his critique of the theological foundations of morality, establishing the metaphysical conditions for the naturalistic ethics developed in the subsequent parts of the Ethics .
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Noa Lahav Ayalon (2026) studied this question.
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