Exploratory research reveals how the Office of Naval Intelligence assessed British naval capabilities, indicating shifts in U.S. strategic focus post-World War II.
1945 to 1947 was a tumultuous time period for the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) as it was for the rest of the United States military. The Office had to begin analyzing the Soviet Union as the U.S.' most likely future enemy at the same time that it dealt with massive budget cuts and major personnel demobilization. More significantly, the Office of Naval Intelligence had to endure these cuts while it began taking on a more global perspective when it came to U.S. national security interests. In this context, this paper explores how the Office of Naval Intelligence viewed and analyzed the British Empire and Commonwealth. In particular, this research looks at how the Office analyzed British naval power in 1946, not as a future potential enemy but as a way to gauge the size of the postwar United States Navy based on the next most powerful fleet. In effect, 1946 is a snapshot transition between the end of the Anglo-American alliance during World War Two and the continuation of that alliance in the early period of the second phase of the Cold War.
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Hal Friedman (2026) studied this question.
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