Genetic Moral Enhancement—A View Based on Mencius’ Theory of Human Nature

Genetic moral enhancement (GME) aims to morally improve a person by using genetic technology. This paper discusses what kinds of GMEs are morally acceptable (or unacceptable) based on Mencius’ theory of human nature. First, I argue that one kind of GME aimed at improving empathic concern to be more inclined to help others can be defended by Mencius’ view of the heart-mind of pity and compassion (ceyinzhixin, 恻隐之心). Second, I show that one kind of GMEs would be morally unacceptable for Mencius based on the Confucian view of love with distinction (aiyouchadeng, 爱有差等). This approach to GME attempts to modify the biological mechanisms underlying empathy, enabling individuals to “feel and experience” others’ pain or harm as if it were their own, thereby making them more inclined to help others.