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We establish a mean-field stochastic framework for analyzing institutional lock-in driven by asymmetric belief updating. A continuum of agents update confidence levels s_tthrough success/failure experiences, with update functions F_S,F_Fexhibiting negativity bias: failures impact beliefs more strongly than successes of equal magnitude. Aggregate confidence I_tinfluences the success probability π(I_t), creating feedback between individual psychology and collective outcomes. We prove existence of stationary equilibria via Schauder’s fixed-point theorem on the space of probability measures P([0,1]), establishing compactness through Prokhorov’s theorem. Stability is characterized via spectral analysis of Fréchet derivatives in the bounded-Lipschitz metric, with operator decomposition into push-forward Lμ^ and rank-one feedback Rμ^ components. Under negativity bias and positive feedback, we establish multiplicity: generically three equilibria (low, middle, high) with stable-unstable-stable pattern. For escape dynamics from stable equilibria, we establish a large deviation principle on Skorokhod space D([0,∞),P([0,1])) with rate function determined by a quasi-potential computed via action functional minimization. Expected escape times scale as exp(N· V) where N is population size and V is the quasi-potential, confirming exponential rarity: for calibrated parameters with N={10}^6 agents, escape times exceed {10}63,900 periods. We derive comparative statics for reform policy through optimal control: value function concavity implies optimal sequencing places high-success-probability reforms first. Material investments M and psychological interventions P exhibit strategic complementarity (∂^2I^/∂ M∂ P>0), verified through implicit function theorem analysis. Numerical verification with {10}^6 Monte Carlo simulations confirms all theoretical predictions, with robustness checks across alternative functional specifications. The framework provides a rigorous foundation for understanding institutional persistence as emerging from collective psychological dynamics rather than material coordination failures, with implications for development economics, political economy, and organizational change.
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Nicolò Bellanca (2026) studied this question.
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