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AbstractMore than the half the people who cross the North Korea–China border are women, with most leaving home to seek food, economic benefits and a more comfortable life. From the human rights perspective, it is clear that the dangerous nature of their journeys across the border and their illegal status in China place them in a very vulnerable position with regard to human trafficking and many types of sexual and physical violence. However, some women voluntarily and strategically use migration, marriage and gender as arenas of agency through which to improve their lives and empower themselves. This paper aims to reveal the complexity of these experiences, which occur where specific forms of gender, intimacy and mobility meet. In doing so, I hope to argue for the possibility of agency beyond an overly simplified victim discourse of North Korean border-crossing. I draw on ethnographic fieldwork in South Korea and China to reveal the trajectories of North Korean female border-crossers who developed survival strategies, and employed their gender and sexuality to skilfully use marriage-migration for their own purposes, empowering them to settle or keep moving on to better places. This instrumental orientation to empowerment worked alongside a more normative orientation to helping their "blood" families back in their homeland through remittances or through being able to bring along children from previous marriages. They were willing to adopt the role of temporary "wife" in order to be good "daughters," "sisters" and "mothers" both now and later. In this sense, the North Korean women and their experiences imply an ambivalent approach to marriage and family.Keywords: Marriage migrantNorth Korean woman border-crosserfamilytraffickingsurvival strategyempowerment AcknowledgementThis work is supported by University of North Korean Studies Research Fund, 2014.Notes1. The term Arduous March originated in Kim, Il-Sung's work as a guerrilla during the Japanese colonial period. The North Korean government used the term to encourage the people to sustain themselves during the 1990s famine, as the government failed to provide food and other necessities. Most North Koreans were forced to find their own ways to survive, and it was in this climate that the black market economy was born.2. Since the division of the two Koreas in 1953 and up to 1998, only 947 people had come to the South, but from 1999 to 2001, 1044 North Koreans arrived in South Korea, exceeding the total over the previous 45 years (Ministry of Unification Citation2014).3. The term refugee sur place indicates that a person may not be a refugee at the time of leaving her/his country but becomes one after the fact. As the North Korean government classifies anybody who leaves the country without permission as a political criminal who has betrayed her/his motherland and people, it has been argued that North Korean border-crossers are refugees sur place (Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2005, cited in Aldrich Citation2011).4. The North Korean government sends an increasing number of people to China, and their remittance to North Korea has become a great financial source of economy. In particular, the government allows more elderly people to go abroad as they are unlikely to migrate to third countries (especially South Korea).5. Since the economic crisis, the North Korean social system seems to have become more corrupt. In order to get a travel pass, a relative visit permit, and Chinese visa, for instance, it is common practice for North Koreans to pay a couple of hundred dollars to bribe someone in authority, with some people even paying an additional 1000 dollars to get a Chinese visa quickly since the whole process can normally take up to 6 months. Owing to such high costs, most North Koreans overstay their visit to China in order to reap some economic benefits that should be far more than visa fee..6. I met a 68 year-old woman in Yanji who came to China with a permit. It lasted for 3 months but she decided to stay longer to earn more money. She said that the government would not punish her as long as she had enough money to pay a fine. Overstaying the official lengths of permits and paying fines are common.7. It is hard to get official data on family reunion migration to South Korea. However, approximately 10% of migrants to South Korea do so for family reasons (KSDC Citation2010, 138–139).8. The breakdown of the formal economy in North Korea has produced an asymmetrical economic structure reliant on the informal economy. Many North Koreans use bribery networks to obtain resources from the formal economy and then trade them in the informal sector to make money. This vicious circle from formal to informal weakens the foundations of the North Korean economy and strengthens the informal sector enormously (see more in Jung and Dalton Citation2006; Haggard and Noland Citation2013). Women take an active role in the informal economy because the patriarchal dominance of North Korean men means they are necessarily linked to the formal economy (Haggard and Noland Citation2013; Park Citation2011).9. I conducted in-depth interviews using the snowball sampling method. In South Korea, I conducted at least two interview sessions with each interviewee as it is essential to construct a rapport with them given the sensitivity of the issue. In China, I used the network of NGO activists to recruit the interviewees. For those I interviewed in China, I had to glean my data in one interview session per interviewee only, as it was extremely difficult to meet regularly due to their illegal status in China. All interviewees were well informed of the research purpose and procedures, and agreed to be a part of my research. Their identities and related privacy information has been treated with a high level of confidentiality.10. Marriage includes cohabitation. The legal institution of marriage is not common for North Koreans, and very few North Korean women manage to get legal documents after marriage in China.11. The report does not specify the population of refugees. It might refer to those who obtain official refugee status, which only represents a small part of the entire population of North Korean border-crossers.12. Their illegal status brings further legal issues for their children. The significant number of children from North Korean mothers and Chinese (or Korean Chinese) fathers remains unregistered. The way to get registered is to buy a Certificate of Residence (hùkǒu) which, in recent years, costs approximately 10,000 yuan. Illegal North Korean women find it hard to get medical treatment, and this means most North Korean women give birth at home with the help of a village midwife (Lee Citation2007; DCNKHR Citation2013).13. Many Korean Chinese are not proficient Korean language speakers, especially those who live in cities. However, many Korean Chinese living in the deep countryside still use Korean as their everyday language. These language issues are why some North Korean women find it easier to settle in Korean Chinese villages, particularly in Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture.14. Their route to South Korea is illegal, as most of them do not have a legal status in China. There are two main routes from China; one is the China–Mongolia route; the other is the China–Laos–Cambodia–Thailand one. Mongolia and Thailand keep a politically neutral position to both Koreas so that North Korean border-crossers can claim refugee status and then choose South Korea for their destination.15. North Korean arrivals are eligible for settlement funds as well as social housing. The sum of the settlement fund is divided into basic, additional and incentive funds. The basic fund of 10,000,000 KRW (one person household) and the deposit money for social housing equivalent to 10,000,000 KRW are provided. Depending on their efforts to achieve self-sustainability, they are eligible to receive an additional amount of up to 15,400,000 KRW, and those who are students, aged over 60, or with a disability are able to apply for further funds up to 15,400,000 KRW (see more details in Kim Citation2012)16. North Korean arrivals receive the legal status of South Korean as soon as they arrive in the South. As a national, a North Korean woman could apply for a marriage certificate with her Chinese husband if she so wished. As most of them do not have a marriage certificate registered in China, they have to register their marriages again in Korea.17. When I worked as a volunteer social worker dealing with North Korean arrivals in South Korea in 2011–12 as a part of my ethnographic research, my responsibility was helping two North Korean families (one a married couple with a teenage son; the other a cohabiting couple). I met 12 North Koreans through the two families on a regular basis and regularly encountered approximately 20 North Korean arrivals in the community centre via various programmes, such as Humanities Lectures, field trips, sports days, a trip to the border and similar activities.Additional informationAuthor's biographySung Kyung Kim currently works at the University of North Korean Studies, Seoul, Korea. She obtained her PhD at the University of Essex, Department of Sociology. Her research interests are mobility in Asia; North Korean defectors; Asian film studies; cultural geography; Asian popular culture; the political economy of cultural industry in Asia and so on. Recent publications are in the field of Asian mobility, North Korean defectors, migration studies, and cultural industry.
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