Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Survey analysis reveals distinct ideological fractures regarding independence among Hungarian judges, highlighting internal institutional compliance under illiberal governance.
The goal of this paper is to explore the attitudes of Hungarian judges towards the “illiberal democracy” project of Victor Orban - twelve years into its development. To this end, 778 anonymous responses of Hungarian judges to the 2022 ENCJ Survey of Judges have been analyzed to classify judges in terms of their attitude towards Orban cabinet. As survey lacked any explicit politics- or ideology-related questions, the perceived “respect” towards judges’ independence as paid by (i) the government and (ii) the Council for the Judiciary (opposing the government of judicial independence grounds) were applied. It turns out that over one third of the judges declared “respected” by both selected institutions (group dubbed “Sanguine” Judges). Another 30% of judges declared feeling “respected” by the Council and “disrespected” by the government (group dubbed “liberals”) while one in twelve judges declared the opposite (group dubbed “illiberals”). Similarities (demographics) and differences (self-assessed independence, irregularities in the case allocation, enforcement of judgments unfavorable to the government, EU membership impact on independence, disciplinary proceedings) between the groups were examined. Paper points to the frequently overlooked aspect of illiberal assaults on judicial institutions: the problem of insider cooperation — or “illiberals within” the judicial branch.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Dijk et al. (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: