Virtually all historical treatments of just war recognize the importance of the account given by Thomas Aquinas in Summa theologiae II-II, q. 40, 'De bello', where he outlines three conditions – legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention – for a justifiable use of armed force. It is, however, less well known that within the same section of the work (q. 50, a. 4) Aquinas extended his reflection on just war into a theory of military prudence. By placing generalship under the category of 'prudence', rather than 'art' or 'science', he held that military command involves more than a morally neutral skill with victory as its sole aim. Building on the premise that service to the common good constitutes the overarching purpose of the military profession, Aquinas showed how the virtue of prudence provides an inner compass for decision-making amid the uncertainty and confusion of the battlefield. Keywords: Thomas Aquinasprudencejust warstrategyvirtuemoralitymilitary profession Notes 1 Unless indicated otherwise, all citations from Aquinas are taken from the Summa theologiae; similarly, it can be assumed that these citations are drawn from the Secunda-secundae part (II-II), unless reference is expressly made to another part of the Summa. Passages are quoted according to the standard textual divisions of part (e.g. 'II-II' – omitted when reference is made to the Secunda-secundae), question ('q.'), article ('a.'), objection ('obj.') and response to objection ('ad'). References are to the Latin version of the Summa theologiae (Aquinas Citation1941–1945); translations are the author's own. For a translation of the entire work, see Aquinas (1948). 2 I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing these two considerations to my attention. 3 In Aquinas's early treatise On the Government of Princes – De regimine principum (English translation in Aquinas Citation2002) – 'preservation of the commonwealth… against external enemies' (bk. 1, ch. 15, p. 28) figures as one of the chief duties of the highest temporal authority, but the point is not discussed by reference to a specific virtue. Earlier in the same work (ch. 9) the types of prudence are listed as three in kind (personal, familial, and political). No mention is made of military prudence, which suggests that the text was written before he had read the De affectibus (see below). 4 For an indication of how this reflection might proceed, see my brief comments in Reichberg (Citation2007: 11–12). 5 Thus it is unsurprising that there is no mention of this virtue in the section of Aquinas's commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (Sententia Libri Ethicorum, VI.7) where he discusses the classification of prudence into different kinds (Aquinas 1969: 355–359). 6 The editor, M. D. Reeve, notes that 'this was among those secular works of Antiquity that medieval readers most often copied, excerpted and translated' (Vegetius 2004: v). 7 Aquinas's reference is actually to a text in which St. Jerome discusses Vegetius' treatment of military exercises in 1.9-28 and 2.23. A direct reference to De re militaris may, however, be found in q. 123, a. 1, ad 2 (on courage), where Aquinas cites Vegetius (bk. 1) to the effect that 'no man fears to do what he is confident of having learned to do well.' Speaking in the same reply about the science or art possessed by soldiers, Aquinas notes how 'through skill and practice in the in the use of arms, they think little of the dangers of battle.' No mention is made here of prudentia. 8 For instance in 3.9.11 (Vegetius 2004: 86), he speaks of those 'skilled in the art of war, – scientes artem bellicam' and then in 1.10.3 (Vegetius 2004: 15), he writes that 'the Romans were trained in the whole art of warfare – omnem rei militaris erudiverant artem'. 9 The De affectibus is cited in q. 48, a.1, obj. 1, where the 'parts of prudence', are listed as 'eubulia, solertia, providentia, regnativa, militaris, politica, oeconomica, dialectica, rhetorica, physica'. The list is also discussed in Aquinas's commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard – III, dist. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 4, ulterius (Aquinas Citation1933: 1072, § 267). The attempt to demonstrate a coherent rationale behind this disparate collection of terms, all purportedly relating to the same virtue of practical wisdom, may have been what led Aquinas to distinguish between the 'integral', 'subjective', and 'potential' parts of a virtue. This classification is first mentioned within the Secunda secundae discussion of prudence (the prologue to q. 48), and is applied subsequently, but does not appear in the earlier questions on faith, hope, and charity. 10 Q. 50, a. 4, ad 1. In the earlier Sentences commentary, III, dist. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 4, solutio 4, ad 4 (Aquinas 1933: 1079, § 301) it is merely assumed that militaris is a species of prudence, based on the typology of the De affectibus. No attempt is made to justify this classification vis-à-vis the more common placement of militaris under art. Rather than debate the suitability of its designation as a kind of prudentia, Aquinas sought instead to explain why military command embodies a distinctive mode of leadership prudence, in contrast to tradesmanship and other such skills necessary for the maintenance of society, which are subsumed under prudentia regnativa. 11 'Recta ratio factabilium' and 'recta ratio agibilium'. 12 'It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art,' Thomas writes, 'as it does when we judge of the end which is a principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does' (I-II, q. 58, art 5, ad 2). In this sense, Aquinas's concept of art is akin to what Kant, in his Grounding for a Metaphysics of Morals (§415), termed a 'a general imperative of skill': 'Here there is no question at all whether the end is reasonable or good, but there is only a question as to what might be done to attain it. The prescriptions needed by a doctor in order to make his patient thoroughly healthy and by a poisoner in order to make sure of killing his victim are of equal value so far as each serves to bring about its purpose perfectly' (Kant Citation1981: 25). 13 Summing this up, Aquinas writes (I-II, q. 65, a. 2) that 'prudence cannot exist without the moral virtues, since these dispose us appropriately toward certain ends, namely those from which prudential reasoning proceeds.' He likewise emphasizes how prudence also requires a link with the theological virtues, charity especially, as by it a human being is well disposed to his ultimate end. See also Aquinas's commentary on Nicomachean Ethics VI, 1140 b21 (Aquinas Citation1969: 347) where he notes how 'the moral virtues preserve the principles of prudence.' 14 The contrast between incomplete (imperfecta) and complete (perfecta) moral virtue is drawn by Aquinas in I-II, q. 65, a. 1. There he explains how by the first we have an inclination to the production of a specific good work, while by the second we are inclined to perform a good deed well. 15 'By a kind of comparison a man may be said to act prudently in matters of art,' Aquinas writes, since 'in certain arts, on account of the uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is need for counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine or navigation' (q. 47, a. 4, ad 2). 16 For instance, in q. 50, a. 3, ad 2, Aquinas notes that household prudence, directed as it is to the good life in general (totum bene vivere) for a family, will be possessed only by those who lead a virtuous life (requiritur vita virtuousa). 17 For the distinction between 'complete' (perfecta) and incomplete (imperfecta) prudence, see q. 47, a. 13. (This obviously runs parallel to the distinction made earlier – I-II, q. 65, a. 1 – between complete and incomplete virtue.) As examples of 'incomplete prudence', Aquinas mentions business acumen, and skill in navigating ships. The article likewise contrasts the two forms of 'true' prudence – 'complete' and 'incomplete' – to the 'false prudence' (prudentia falsa) of thieves and other such malefactors who successfully employ their minds for the promotion of evil ends. 18 This is overlooked in the standard English translation of the Summa (Aquinas Citation1948: 1402) which takes militaris to be an adjective, thereby requiring the translator to identify a suitable noun when none is given in the text. By selecting 'prudence' for this task, this translation commits the redundancy of asking 'whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence.' 19 The text of Nicomachean Ethics 1094a 1–20 is cited in Aquinas (1969: 3). 20 Aquinas wrote a detailed commentary on this biblical text (Aquinas Citation1989). 21 In this connection, see the recent testimony of As'ad Shaftari, a former intelligence officer in a Lebanese Christian militia, who admits (and now deeply regrets) having tortured and killed Palestinians, to defend 'what I thought was Christianity in Lebanon' (Worth Citation2010). 22 For an indication of what norms of war were operative in Aquinas's own day, see Keen (Citation1965). Aquinas mentioned at least two of these norms: the prohibition against lying to enemy belligerents (as opposed to ambushes and other forms of deception, that he deemed licit), or against breaking promises (both prohibitions are mentioned in q. 40, a. 3). See also Aquinas's very emphatic statement in q. 64, a. 6 'it is in no way (nullo modo) permitted to slay the innocent', which would appear to exclude (although he does not himself draw out this implication) the intentional killing of enemy non-combatants. 23 For a good survey of on the virtues relevant to the exercise just war, see the article by Ryan Gorman in this issue of Journal of Military Ethics (Gorman Citation2010). 24 It should be noted, however, that the moral virtues need not be possessed with equal firmness and consistency, nor will a weakening of each and every one of them have the same deleterious effect on military prudence as would a deficiency of justice (a virtue consisting in a 'perpetual and constant will to render each man his due' [q. 58. a. 1]). 25 On 'moralism', understood as a stance opposed to the exigencies of moral prudence, see Maritain (Citation1952), where the French philosopher argues that Thomistic prudentia, as applied to the political sphere, seeks the mean between a purely artistic conception of politics on the one hand, and the undue application of personal ethical norms ('ultramoralism'), on the other. For a recent workup of this theme, including a useful typology of different types of moralism, see Coady (Citation2008). 26 On the special qualities of mind needed for military command, see Clausewitz's treatment of coup d'oeil and courage d'esprit in Vom Kriege, bk. 1, chap. 3 (passages reproduced in Reichberg et al. 2006: 557–559).
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Gregory M. Reichberg (2010) studied this question.