War in the borderland through cyberspace: Limits of defending Ukraine through interstate cooperation

ABSTRACTPrior to the onset of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, experts predicted an extensive cyber conflict. However, to date the scale of known cyberattacks has been quite modest. Pundits suggest that Ukraine's improved cyber defenses, which it developed through its close cooperation with Western partners, is one of the possible explanations for Russia's limited cyber front. This article interrogates this claim, outlining two plausible reasons for the limited effectiveness of Ukraine's cyber defenses in the Kremlin's limited cyber front. First, despite an extensive outpouring of cyber knowledge and expertise from the West, Ukraine's cyber capabilities are still organizationally and operationally underdeveloped. Second, limited fungibility of cyber capabilities complicates interoperability between any joint operations and diminishes the West's willingness to share their time-limited cyber tools with Ukraine. By explaining the challenges of interstate cooperation in the cyber domain, this article contributes to the literature on the role of alliances in modern warfare.KEYWORDS: Cyber operationsalliancesRusso-Ukrainian warcorruptionbureaucratic feudsfungibility AcknowledgementsAndres Gannon and Jon Lindsay provided helpful comments on the earlier drafts of this article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Since we are interested in cooperation between aligned partners, our primary goal is to evaluate government-to-government cooperation and not private-to-public cooperation. Because of that, our scope condition excludes cyber actions by only commercial cybersecurity providers. Despite that, we expect that the two challenges we highlight here should also apply to private-to-public cooperation.2 This is based on the first-hand experiences of contacts in areas not occupied by Russian forces in multiple oblasts and updated on a regular basis.3 For instance, governmental websites that suffered a distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attack in January and February were quickly restored; no data was lost or rendered unusable: (Kurmanau & Bajak, Citation2022; Mclaughlin, Citation2022; Zetter, Citation2022).4 One of the authors discussed these issues with Liam Collins who led US efforts to reform Ukraine's defense sector and met Ukrainian officials in 2018. The same concerns all remained.5 For an example of crowd funding, see: https://www.peoplesproject.com/en/6 For instance, many countries of the former Soviet Union (Legvold, Citation2009)and Latin America (Lambsdorff et al., Citation2005) experience high levels of corruption.7 This is based on discussions with individuals in Russian Controlled Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast. These individuals indicated complete Russian control over internet infrastructure including the use of surveillance and EW technologies and stop and search checks of mobile devices.Additional informationNotes on contributorsNadiya KostyukNadiya Kostyuk is an assistant professor at the School of Public Policy and the School of Cybersecurity and Privacy at Georgia Institute of Technology. Her research focuses on security studies, modern warfare, cyber conflict, cyber institutions and capability, and Russian and Eurasian politics. Kostyuk's research has been published or is forthcoming in the Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Global Security Studies, Journal of Strategic Security, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Cyber Defense Review, and several edited volumes and general-audience publications. Kostyuk is a director of the Cybersecurity Summer Institute and is a co-organizer of the Digital Issues Discussion Group.Aaron BrantlyAaron Brantly is an associate professor of Political Science and Director of the Tech4Humanity Lab in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences at Virginia Tech. His research focuses on national security policy issues in cyberspace including artificial intelligence, decision-making, and human rights. He is the author or editor of four books, The Decision to Attack: Military and Intelligence Cyber Decision-making, US national Cybersecurity: International Politics, Concepts and Organization, Cybersecurity: Politics, Governance and Conflict in Cyberspace, and The Cyber Deterrence Problem. Brantly's research has been published in the Journal of Information Technology and Politics, Journal of Cyber Policy, Journal of Cybersecurity, Survival, Intelligence and National Security, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, and multiple edited volumes and general audience publications. Brantly is also the lead faculty in Virginia Tech's Integrated Security Program.