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Citing Harry Stack Sullivan, Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca write in The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation: “The audience, as visualized by one undertaking to argue, is always a more or less systematized construction. . . . The essential consideration for the speaker who has set himself the task of persuading concrete individuals is that his construction of the audience should be adequate to the occasion” (1971, 19). I seek to persuade the audience I have constructed for this review that Blake D. Scott has written a strikingly important book with novel insights and arguments. This audience includes a particular audience, subscribers to the Journal for the History of Rhetoric, graduate students, junior and senior scholars in rhetoric and composition; Scott’s target audience, philosophers; a composite audience of readers who start from different value frames but can ultimately agree if compelling arguments of congruence and consilience are deployed; and an implied universal audience I hold in my imagination that sets the standards for the judgment of the strength and weakness of my claims using what Scott calls contrastivism (2024).Scott takes on an audacious goal: to tilt at the philosophy-rhetoric binary that contemporary philosophers embrace. “Most philosophers,” he observes, “tend to think of [rhetoric] as something foreign, something other than what they do” (1). To philosophers, rhetoric is the other of philosophy. Scott seeks to “recast the way that philosophers usually understand rhetoric” (1) and persuade them to embrace rhetoricity (“rhetorical dimension of all discourse” [2]) as a fundamental human capacity that “invites a Copernican revolution in the philosopher’s conventional way of thinking about [rhetoric]” (274). He devotes his book to Chaïm Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s “radical” claim that philosophers should shift their focus to audiences rather than remaining strictly within the analytic tradition that flees culture, social history, and situated audiences.Scott offers a novel approach to reading Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric in The Rhetoricity of Philosophy. This approach involves viewing the work through the lens of “philosophical epoch” and “rhetorical reduction” and entails temporarily suspending ontological and epistemological assumptions to describe the essential features of argumentation reason in their work. Readers can then better understand the argument encyclopedia and taxonomy presented in The New Rhetoric without the influence of ideological commitments. While James Crosswhite’s Deep Rhetoric (2013) highlights the profound ontological and epistemological aspirations of The New Rhetoric, Scott’s proposed approach allows for an understanding of the argumentative reason within The New Rhetoric itself, free from any predetermined ideological perspectives.I imagine that all the audiences I seek to persuade would commend Scott’s archival research in the very rich Chaïm Perelman archives at Université libre de Bruxelles, including Perelman’s extensive correspondence with twentieth-century philosophers and other scholars. He is intimately familiar with the works of Alain Badiou and Barbara Cassin. His command of Paul Ricoeur’s work places him in the same league as top Ricoeur scholars, including Carnegie Mellon University’s Andreea Ritivoi and Indiana University’s John Arthos.I do not know of another scholar who has paired Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric project and Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics with such sophistication and to such good purpose. Scott is quickly becoming one of the best interpreters of the New Rhetoric project. His close reading of the project and his use of Ricoeur’s insights produced a new reading that moves close to the intentions of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. He adds his own innovation. “As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do not fully explicate the details of their operative method,” he observes, there is a need to introduce “phenomenological vocabulary to identify . . . their ‘philosophical epoché’ and ‘rhetorical reduction’” (279). Using this new vocabulary, critics can better understand the intent and function of the argumentation taxonomy displayed in The New Rhetoric.Scott’s book is a dramatic history, a courtroom drama, and a documentary mystery. He offers a history of rhetoric, beginning with Plato’s Gorgias and ending with Posselt and Heetzel’s 2023 attempt to integrate the rhetorical perspective into critical theory, which Scott rightly claims is partially successful. The three ancient touchstones of this history—Plato’s Gorgias and Phaedrus and Aristotle’s Rhetoric—serve as the key witnesses and sources in a courtroom drama pitting Alain Badiou and Barbara Cassin against Chaïm Perelman. Badiou, the Platonist, charges Perelman with sophistry. Cassin, the Sophist, indicts Perelman for the crime of Platonism.Serving in the role of Perelman’s defense attorney, Scott acquits Perelman of both charges with, in my judgment, a brilliant set of moves. These moves are enactments of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s notion of dissociation, the separation and creative rearrangement of apparent binaries. Scott offers strong evidence, based on a close and thorough reading of Badiou and Cassin, that both are tethered to the audiences they construct and attempt to persuade. Scott explains that Perelman is neither a Platonist nor a Sophist but a pluralist. Perelman draws from Plato’s Phaedrus and its aspiration that rhetoric should please the gods and from many but not all of the principles set forth by the Sophists. The through line of Scott’s defense of Perelman is the audience, constructed and imagined, as the target of all philosophical argumentation.Scott’s reading of Perelman through the work of Ricoeur is a true breakthrough in rhetorical theory. Scott effectively joins Ricoeur’s hermeneutical method to the New Rhetoric project. In addition, this breakthrough turns on a documentary mystery about Ricoeur’s lecture in 1970 at the Institut des hautes études in Belgium titled “Rhetoric-Poetics-Hermeneutics.” Given Perelman’s stature, his network of philosopher colleagues, and the fact that he was the president of the institute, Perelman must have invited him. Moving from a defense attorney to a stemmatologist (one who studies the evolution and changes in a text), Scott traces the trajectory of the 1970 lecture through various iterations. I read the lecture in Michel Meyer’s From Metaphysics to Rhetoric (1989) in the 1990s but was unaware until Scott’s investigations that the text of the 1970 lecture did not find its way into print (207). Ricoeur published an updated version sometime after 1977, Scott notes, because the 1986 version cites Ricoeur’s 1975 The Rule of Metaphor (1975/1986) and Perelman’s The Realm of Rhetoric (1977/1982). Why is this important? Because Ricoeur responds to Perelman in subsequent writings by acknowledging the centrality of the audience and the fact that it is possible to persuade philosophers to “recast the way philosophers usually understand rhetoric” (213). Scott’s explanation of this change is well-developed.Scott concludes with eight insights that equip rhetorical theory with arguments my three audiences should find persuasive. The title of the conclusion is “Is Rhetoric a Dead-End for Philosophy?” Scott answers this question no, with a well-developed yet succinct summary of the evidence he has marshaled. Using the method Scott, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and I endorse, assessing the strength and weakness of arguments with a comparative method, The Rhetoricity of Philosophy fortifies my preexisting belief in the importance of the audience in rhetorical argumentation. My belief is reinforced by the new evidence offered: the Platonist Alain Badiou, the Sophist Barbara Cassin, and the hermeneutist Paul Ricoeur all must and do attend to their audiences. For the subscribers of this journal and for readers already committed to rhetoric and rhetoricity, Scott’s book will be viewed as a species of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s epideictic genre, a splendid effort to strengthen and develop rhetoric’s efforts to collaborate with philosophy and ask philosophers to accept rhetoric as a human capacity.My universal audience, an imagined group of the best scholars I know, would find Scott’s argument persuasive. This audience would include colleagues, dead and alive, whom I greatly respect and admire, including Xing Lu, WooSoo Park, Mark McPhail, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, Michael Leff, Jerry Murphy, Sean O’Rourke, Martin Medhurst, Robert Rowland, and Dominic LaRusso. This audience would also include A. J. Ayer, H. L. A. Hart, and Peter Strawson, prominent philosophers who celebrated the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.Scott’s argument would tempt some members of my composite audience. Social scientists represented in this audience have seen and will see the value of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s focus on the lived experiences of audiences and the role of time in argumentation. I am much less confident that Scott will persuade philosophers, but not because his arguments are weak. His target audience has been primed to distrust rhetoric, root and branch. Regardless, I am persuaded that the argument of The Rhetoricity of Philosophy is correct, as is Scott’s method of persuasion: to identify within the works of philosophers evidence that they construct an audience for their arguments.I join Scott, as should all rhetoricians, in seeking to align our discipline with philosophy. His vision of successfully persuading philosophers to embrace rhetoric will take us on a quixotic journey as the odds of persuading philosophers to abandon their prejudice against rhetoric are long. As he correctly notes, philosophers “think of philosophy and rhetoric like oil and water,” and “the roots of philosophy’s traditional hostility towards rhetoric are deep and continue to prevent philosophers from reassessing its value for their own practice” (5).As I join Scott’s journey and think about his target audience, I want to construct an image of this audience of philosophers that is adequate for this occasion. In A Social History of Analytic Philosophy (2025), published the same year as The Rhetoricity of Philosophy, Christoph Schuringa opens with this sentence: “Analytic philosophy, today the hegemonic form of academic philosophy in the English-speaking world and beyond, tends to think of itself as removed from the changing scenes of history. It acts as if it were perusing its questions from a vantage point situated nowhere in particular, unaffected by social and political reality. It thus operates as a tradition that manages to think of itself as no tradition at all” (1). In an attempt to persuade philosophers to value rhetoric, we face an audience anchored in a hegemonic ideology that holds a centuries-long hostility to our discipline.Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s dissociation of the rhetoric-philosophy binary in The New Rhetoric is framed as a rapprochement (1971, 5). That wonderful word, derived from the French verb rapprocher, which means “to bring near,” is intended to reestablish cordial relations and bring entities at odds into alignment. Rapprochement is a spiritual force that informs Perelman’s commitment to pluralism (Frank 1998). Perelman blamed Peter Ramus, a sixteenth-century educator, for detaching rhetoric from reason and banishing it to the pale of tropes. The New Rhetoric project was designed to reunite reason and rhetoric and rescue it from the fate it suffered in the aftermath of Ramus’s reform. Unfortunately, as Scott notes, even with the call by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca for a rapprochement, Ricoeur and other philosophers fear that rhetoric’s agenda is to “totalize the field of discourse” (211), obliterating the differences between and among the liberal arts.Scott is taking the right approach—rhetoricians should read the works of philosophy with care and identify within these writings the fact that philosophers construct audiences and that their arguments are nested in history, time, and vantage points affected by social and political reality. However, this does not mean that philosophers must embrace a particular ontology or epistemology. Indeed, Scott’s mode of reading The New Rhetoric with “philosophical epoché” and “rhetorical reduction” (279) evades ontological and epistemological commitments and should offer analytic philosophers a bridge between the two disciplines that could open up a shared recognition of the role played by audiences in philosophy and rhetoric. The Rhetoricity of Philosophy is at the disciplinary forefront of a genuinely quixotic effort to dissociate the oil of philosophy from the water of rhetoric and confront the hegemony of the analytic tradition and the pincer movement in which rhetoric is simultaneously attacked as an expression of Platonic absolutism and a sophistic relativism.
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David Frank (2025) studied this question.
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