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Heraclitus holds that “War is the father and king of all.” I agree. However, I would phrase it differently than he, as his way of putting it has sexist implications. I was thirteen when I first read the fragments of Heraclitus (Sorgner 2016). The edition I have had includes comments by related insights from various great philosophers and thinkers. There, Nietzsche was referred to, who developed this insight further by creating his will-to-power ontology of becoming (Sorgner 2007; Tuncel 2017) and who employed extremely harsh polemics to make readers aware of some new philosophical perspectives. That such harsh polemics can promote new insights is one of the many things that I learnt from engaging with Nietzsche’s thinking, which I did as a consequence of reading Heraclitus. Conflict, war, and strife are extremely helpful for clarifying issues, specifying distinctions, and realizing what is appropriate in certain circumstances. This insight can be applied in many different circumstances and disciplines. Joseph Schumpeter dealt with this aspect of Nietzsche’s thinking, developed it further, and coined the economic concept of “creative destruction.” To consider that new insights are the result of intense conflicts is also relevant in the new context of posthuman studies. A good journal also promotes new perspectives on the world. Consequently, I will begin this editorial with a polemic.Many leading critical posthumanists who claim to be doing posthumanist ethics discuss only the great variety of interactions between entities, not realizing Hume’s law, which is taught in all introductory courses in ethics, that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” If you merely talk about altered understandings of relations between living entities, and not about values, norms, and the moral status of an entity, you are not doing normative ethics, but ontology. Even though these ontological observations might have some relevance for ethical reflections, there is no direct connection to normative judgements, as it is impossible to derive an “ought” directly from an “is.” A notable exception is Mark Coeckelbergh, who, when he develops his “normative ethics of vulnerability (and indeed a fully relational anthropology)” (Coeckelbergh 2013, 10) as his proposal for a modest ethics (101), acknowledges the philosophical challenges related to Hume’s law. The best posthumanist ethicist, however, is Peter Singer, as Steve Fuller rightly stressed (2014), even though he himself does not explicitly regard himself as a posthumanist. Critical posthumanists can benefit significantly from his position as well as from the ethical reflections of transhumanists, whose major strengths are exchanges on applied ethical normative issues.Many leading transhumanists, on the other hand, claim that transhumanism is a continuation of the Enlightenment tradition, not realizing that it is self-contradictory to affirm a naturalist anthropology and to claim that one is a part of the Enlightenment tradition. Dominant Enlightenment anthropologies imply that human beings consist of a material body and an immaterial rational mind, with Descartes and Kant being two paradigmatic Enlightenment philosophers. A naturalistic anthropology, on the other hand, rejects the possibility of an immaterial rational mind. Consequently, it is self-contradictory to affirm a naturalist anthropology and to claim that one’s thinking belongs to the Enlightenment tradition. A notable exception is James Hughes, who correctly stresses that “transhumanism has also inherited the internal tensions and contradictions of the broad Enlightenment tradition” (Hughes 2010, 622). However, this level of historic philosophical expertise is not shared by the majority of transhumanist thinkers, whereas it is a central aspect of critical posthumanism, which is why transhumanists can develop much further intellectually by engaging with reflections put forward by critical posthumanists in this respect.Consequently, critical posthumanists can benefit enormously from transhumanists when it comes to normative ethical issues, whereas transhumanists can learn a lot from critical posthumanists when fundamental ontological issues are being tackled. This is one of the central tasks of this journal. The journal is supposed to provide a setting that promotes intellectual engagement outside of one’s established discourses. An inclusive discourse is one that embraces openness to the other’s perspective, and not one that preaches inclusiveness as an empty formula. Maybe you disagree with my aforementioned judgements concerning the strength and weaknesses of post- and transhumanist thinking. These, too, can be challenged in intellectual exchanges that take place in this journal. My evaluations might be implausible, misinformed, or overtly limited, after all. I agree. I am a weak thinker. Yet, maybe, my perspectival weakness is one of the most important philosophical achievements, which is related to postmodernity. By overcoming a humanist account of subjectivity, critical posthumanists, as well as transhumanists, ought to embrace such a weak epistemological position, which implies that all philosophical judgments are interpretations. It is important to note here that the concept of an interpretation implies that the judgment can be false, but not that is has to be false. Hence, this philosophical perspective is not one to which the liar’s paradox applies. Once you affirm that a judgment has to be false, you embrace a clear standard of truth that renders your initial epistemological stance self-contradictory. If you hold that all perspectives are interpretations, this also has to apply to your own perspective, and this has to imply that no judgment can be referred to as false. It is this kind of weakness and philosophical modesty to which I am referring. Both critical posthumanists and naturalist transhumanists no longer embrace the hybris that has been a central part of philosophy since Plato, namely that human beings possess an immaterial rational mind that provides them with a categorical ontological special status in this world. Hence, both critical posthumanists and transhumanists ought to embrace this epistemological modesty: All they can do is to present judgments that can be false without ever even being able to philosophically falsify another perspective. I regard this weakness as an enormous advantage, as it reduces the violence within the intellectual war of values that is such a central part of all philosophical and cultural exchanges (Sorgner 2017).I very much hope that this initial polemic promotes the intensity and precision of the future posthuman exchanges that will occur in this journal. I am already extremely happy about the quality and timeliness of the articles that we have received so far, and that have undergone a rigid peer review process.In the article “Excavating the Centrality of Materiality for a Posthuman ‘Anthropomediality,’” Alberto Micali presents the “concept of ‘anthropomediality’” and “traces a new path for the anthropological study of media, moving toward the posthuman.” Thereby, he provides a state-of-the-art survey of the discourses and presents elements of a more refined version for which he argues. The relational aspect is not absent from Benedikt Göcke’s new transhumanist approach, either. In his article “Moderate Transhumanism and Compassion,” he stresses the relevance of a “moderate transhumanism” that is based upon the “concept of compassion.” Emergent technologies and “sciences provide the means to reduce” suffering, and our compassion leads us “to use the means provided by the sciences.” These reflections lead to his claim that compassion “logically entails the agenda of moderate transhumanism.” The need to introduce and consider a new perspective is also presented by Galit Wellner in her contribution on a “Posthuman Imagination.” She begins with the claim that “modern imagination consists of searching after new points of view, as reflected in the operations of photography and cinema.” Yet the latest cultural and technological developments make relevant the concept of a posthuman imagination, which “functions in layers presented over the real, similarly to augmented reality technologies.” Technological innovations lead not only to new concepts, but also to the importance of rethinking traditional experiences. This is what Iddo Landau does in his article “The Case for Technological Mysticism.” As “some types of physical incitement may spur mystical enlightenment,” he infers that “technology may well provide people with a reliable, easy, and safe way to attain mystical experiences.” Technological developments also challenge dominant concepts of gender. Malcolm Matthews reflects upon the complexity of these developments in his contribution “Ex Machina and the Fate of Posthuman Masculinity.” According to his reading, “Alex Garland’s film Ex Machina (2015) exemplifies the degree to which hegemonic masculinity is culturally entrenched and the lengths humanist man will go to preserve himself.” Posthumanist theories move beyond long-established gender paradigms, but “Ex Machina articulates this resistance and exposes male anxieties in the face of posthuman reconfigurations of subjectivity and redefinitions of masculinity in a technocentric era.” Posthumanist theories have radical implications concerning not only gender, but also race. Philip Butler deconstructs “the language employed by critical posthumanism” in his contribution “Making Enhancement Equitable.” He shows “that many Black folks, in the United States, are just beginning to explore what it means to be both Black and human within the bounds of ‘equality.’” This is a challenge for the posthumanist task of undermining the exceptional status of human beings by stressing “human animality,” which is being undertaken by “white scholars” who “propose a futuristic critical framework without employing a thorough assessment of race,” from his point of view.All of these contributions raise significant questions concerning the paradigm-shifting cultural events that occur as a consequence of innovations, new scientific insights, and emergent technologies. The relicts of the humanist cultures are strongly entrenched in our life world. The various radical questions presented by posthumanist reflections and moral demands by transhumanists represent groundbreaking challenges to our established ways of dealing with the world. These challenges need to be dealt with within transdisciplinary and metacultural discourses. I am already looking forward to receiving your responses to these reflections, and also your new most cherished insights concerning the great variety of emergent posthuman issues.
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Stefan Lorenz Sorgner (2018) studied this question.
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