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Postpositivists, such as Mishler (1990) and Lincoln and Guba (1985), have commonly claimed that there are substantial methodological and epistemological differences between their framework and that of the conventional or positivistic approach. On the face of it, this claim is indisputable. For example, Lincoln and Guba in Naturalistic Inquiry (1985) lay out five key differences in terms of ontology, epistemology, generalizability, causality, and axiology (p. 37). In contrast, it is argued here, as a result of a deconstructive investigation, that the conventional approach and more radical versions of postpositivism are, in a primary way, profoundly and disturbingly similar. This point is pursued by investigating the transgressive practices of validity across both conventional and more radical postpositivist research orientations and ends with new imaginaries of validity that make problematic conventional and postpositivist validity practices and celebrate the play of multiplicity and difference.
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James Joseph Scheurich (1996) studied this question.
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