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Kit Fine has put forward a new argument for the coincidence between a statue and a clay, according to which the two differ in numerous sortalish properties that are non-modal. In this paper I offer a one-thinger response to Fine’s argument. The key to my response is the notion of sortal counterparts. Just as in the modal case we can relegate the conflicting modal properties of the statue and the clay to distinct modal counterparts, in the non-modal case we should relegate the conflicting simple sortalish properties to distinct sortal counterparts. Sortal counterparts, I argue, aren’t just the conceptual tool that we need for resolving the puzzle over conflicting sortals, they also help to shed light on the idea of a sortal paradigm and how sortal generalizations can survive recalcitrant exceptions.
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Zeyu Chi (2025) studied this question.
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