Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
right to morality (Moralitat) and its internal division into responsibility, welfare and conscience. He moves from morality to the forms of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which include the family, civil society, the state and relations between states. The ‘higher dialectic’ is the movement of right through its various concepts and shapes. It is not an ‘external activity of subjective thought... but the very soul of the content which puts forth its branches and fruit organically’ and which thought merely observes (Hegel §). Hegel’s philosophy of right foregoes the purely historical task of viewing ‘the emergence and development of determinations of right as they appear in time’ (Hegel §R), for the development from the most abstract to the most concrete is a conceptual sequence which may or may not coincide with the temporal sequence of their actual appearance. Hegel characterises his methodology thus: We merely wish to observe how the concept determines itself, and we force ourselves not to add anything of our own thought and opinions. What we obtain in this way, however, is a series of thoughts and another series of existent shapes, in which it may happen that the temporal sequence of their actual appearance is to some extent different from the conceptual sequence. Thus we cannot say, for example, that property existed before the family, although property is nevertheless dealt with first. One might accordingly ask at this point why we do not begin with the highest instance, that is, with the concretely true. The answer will be that we wish to see the truth precisely in the form of a result, and it is essential for this purpose that we should first comprehend the abstract concept itself. What is actual, the shape which the concept assumes, is therefore from our point of view only the subsequent and further stage, even if it should come first itself in actuality. The course we follow is that whereby the abstract forms reveal themselves not as existing for themselves, but as untrue (Hegel §A). Hegel provided the model for Marx. Marx too started from the simplest and most abstract elements of contemporary society and worked upwards toward the more complex and concrete. It is only their subject matter that is different and marks them apart. Capital & Class #75 78 The case for reading Hegel and Marx together In the Philosophy of Right Hegel explores the forms of right which constitute political modernity while in Capital Marx explores the forms of value which constitute economic modernity. Another way of putting this is to say that the subject matter of the Philosophy of Right comprises the forms taken by subjects in the modern age, that is, the people who bring their commodities to market (including their own capacity for labour and intellectual ideas) and sell them in exchange for money or other goods. The subject matter of Capital comprises the forms taken by things in modern capitalist society; that is, by the products of human labour. We should not make any a priori assumption that one subject matter is more essential than the other. With Hegel we address the ideal forms of modernity, with Marx its material forms. But their work is complementary in that Hegel’s analysis is concerned with the forms of right which constitute modern political life, while Marx’s analysis is concerned with the forms of value which constitute modern economic life. Read together, they offer a more ‘rounded’ image of modernity as a whole than each can offer in isolation. Marx did not realise how closely his method followed that developed by Hegel in the Philosophy of Right. Both start with the simplest and most abstract form of their subject matter and progress to more complex and concrete forms. In relation to the political forms of the modern age Hegel argues that the simplest and most abstract element is abstract right and analyses its self-division into ‘person’ and ‘thing’. In relation to the economic forms of the modern age Marx contends that the simplest and most abstract element is the commodity and analyses its self-division into value and use value. For Hegel, the movement is from abstract right through contract and law to the state. For Marx, it is from value through exchange value and money to capital. They both begin with simple forms which permit them to explain more developed forms and order their presentation according to the increasing complexity of these forms, so that at every level the theory can be formulated in terms of concepts elaborated at the previous level. In neither case are we presented with the ‘empirically existent’, for both the forms of the state and the forms of capital abstract from all the contingencies, accidents and differences which they possess in actual political and economic systems, but in neither case 79 The Marx-Hegel relationship are we given an a priori construction. Their objects of investigation are different but their approach to scientific investigation is the same. Capital and the Philosophy of Right also supplement one another by overcoming the other’s potential limitations. In the case of the Philosophy of Right, what is overcome is the idealism which flows from identifying modernity exclusively with the ideal forms of legal and political life. In the case of Capital what is overcome is the materialism which flows from identifying modernity equally exclusively with the material forms of economic life. In fact, Hegel was an idealist only to the extent that he focused on the ideal forms of subjectivity which mark the modern age at the expense of the material forms taken by products of human labour; and Marx was a materialist only to the extent that he focused on the economic forms taken by the products of labour at the expense of the ideal forms of the modern subject. Both Hegel’s idealism and Marx’s materialism are wrong only to the extent that they are one-sided, but in their own spheres of investigation they are equally valid. Such tendencies to one-sidedness as are present in Hegel and Marx may have been accentuated, however, in two traditions of social theory derived from them: one drawn from Hegel, fixes on the forms of freedom and discipline which mark the modern age and uses the concept of modernity to convey this focus; the other drawn from Marx, concentrates on the commodification of social life and uses the term capitalism. (Fine : ch.) Recognition of the unity of Hegel and Marx allows us to keep in mind that the dichotomies of the modern age— subject and object, person and thing, freedom and determination, politics and economics, right and value—are social rather than merely cognitive and historically grounded rather than reducible to general considerations of an abstract theoretical type. It means that we start from the substance of the social order rather than proceed atomistically and end up in the juxtaposition of separate spheres. It makes it possible to comprehend the twin illusions of the modern age, political freedom as well as economic determination, the fetishism of the subject as well as the fetishism of the commodity, rather than oscillate from side to side. If Hegel’s concern was with personification and the fetishism of the subject, and Marx’s with reification and the fetishism of the commodity, it is when we draw these abstract forms of domination together that we can see a) that the modern age Capital & Class #75 80 creates and recreates these divisions and oppositions, b) that the achievement of the modern age is to contain and support such contradictions, and c) that the greatest danger arises when subject and object are cast adrift from and lose touch with one another. One manifestation of this separation is to be found in the phenomenon of totalitarianism, and one substantial ‘payoff’ of this intellectual reconstruction of the Hegel-Marx relation lies in our refreshed ability to grasp a phenomenon with which Marx never got to grips and on which Marxism has all too often foundered. Hegel’s philosophy of right embraces the r ight of subjective freedom as a supreme achievement of the modern age, but it also stands in opposition to subjectivism (or the fetishism of the subject) which converts the subject into an absolute and fixes on this moment in its ‘difference from and opposition to the universal’ (Hegel §R). Hegel’s insistence that the goal of a free mind is to ‘make freedom objective’ indicates both that the right of subjective freedom has to be actualised in the world as something substantial and politically real, and that the metamorphosis of the subject into a supreme power, unrestricted by any spiritual or material constraint, is not the goal of a free mind. For Hegel, the distinction between subjectivity and subjectivism is crucial. If the former is the achievement of the modern age, the latter constitutes its pathology. For the subject becomes like a God. Its will appears absolute. It demands to be worshipped. What starts life as a principle of critical thought becomes in the course of its own development a source of modern superstition and subjection. Nowhere is this critique more sharply drawn out than in Hegel’s analysis of the subjectivism of the modern state. The state presents itself as an earthly God. It assumes its own divinity. It demands to be worshipped. It equates itself to the power of reason itself. It does not appear as a form of right relative to all other forms, but as the Absolute. The concept of the modern state is itself irrational, one-sided, untrue. The contradiction at the heart of the modern state, as Hegel presents it, does not lie in the difference between its concept and the grubby empirical existence of actual states but in the concept itself. The pretension of the modern state to be absolute is dangerous enough without political philosophy demanding that all obstacles to the realisation of this pretension be overcome. 81 The Marx-Hegel relationship
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Robert Fine (2001) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: