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As a long-term admirer of David Hume, I was struck with some astonishment, on a second reading of Of Miracles, that someone so influential and profound could make such an obvious and seemingly deliberate logical fallacy. Moreover, the fallacy Hume commits—the ad hominem fallacy—is not a minor error insignificant to the whole of his argument, but is a major component to Hume's rejection of miracles and, more generally, to his dismissal of testimony as sound epistemology. My astonishment at Hume's remarks, coupled with my bias of his philosophy, led me (rightly or wrongly) to want to justify—and perhaps apologize or even excuse—his personal argument against the credibility of those professing to have been witness to a miracle. Help in this regard came from an unlikely source: Formal testimony in Canadian law. The thesis I will argue for is that arguments of the form argumentum ad hominem (literally, 'argument against a man'), when they are of the non-fallacious type, are forms of critical reasoning every thinking person is obliged to commit. In other words, I'll argue for the normative justification of non-fallacious ad hominem arguments. Since the distinction between fallacious and non-fallacious forms of ad hominem arguments is well known, I will restrict myself to the following brief characterization. It is not the case that every instance of an ad hominem argument is fallacious. Consider,
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Joel Buenting (2004) studied this question.
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