Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution

In Freedom's Law, Ronald Dworkin propounds his theory of constitutional interpretation and applies it to some of the most controversial constitutional issues of the last twenty years, including abortion, affirmative action, pornography, hate speech, gay rights, euthanasia, and free speech. Although each of the chapters of the book was first published as a separate essay, together they provide an engaging and coherent account of Dworkin's constitutional philosophy. In the first part of the book, Dworkin elaborates and argues for what he calls the moral reading of the Constitution. The United States Constitution, like most contemporary constitutions, defines individual rights in very broad and language. The Fourth Amendment, for example, protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Eighth Amendment protects against cruel and unusual punishment. According to the moral reading, clauses that incorporate such terms should be construed as referring to abstract moral principles and las] incorporatling] these by reference, as limits on government's power. (p. 7). The moral reading of the Constitution, on Dworkin's view, implies that government must treat all those subject to its dominion as having equal moral and political status; it must attempt, in good faith, to treat them all with equal concern; and it must respect whatever individual freedoms are indispensable to those ends, including but not limited to the freedoms more specifically designated in the document, such as the freedoms of speech and religion. (p. 8). Since constitutional rights are not limited to those specifically mentioned in the Constitution, constitutional interpretation requires the sort of analysis that is common to applied moral philosophy. On Dworkin's view, then, one cannot resolve a constitutional question about what equal protection requires without resolving the corresponding moral question of what the moral notion of equality requires. In this way, Dworkin's theory brings political morality into the heart of constitutional law. (p.2) Unfortunately, Dworkin does not always apply these doctrines consistently in addressing specific legal problems. For example, while the