Sustainable Governance of Photovoltaic Desert Control from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory: A Case Study in Xinjiang, China

Photovoltaic desert control (PVDC), an innovative model integrating clean energy development and desertification control, faces complex coordination challenges among local governments, local communities, and photovoltaic enterprises. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to identify the conditions that drive PVDC toward coordinated governance. The model defines a three-dimensional strategy space: government regulatory intensity (Strong vs. Lax), community willingness to cooperate (Active Cooperation vs. Passive Resistance), and enterprise ecological integration (Active Ecological Integration vs. Passive Land Occupation). Replicator dynamic equations are derived to characterize nonlinear interactions, and the stability conditions of eight pure-strategy equilibrium points are identified through Jacobian matrix eigenvalue analysis. Numerical simulations are conducted using a baseline parameter set that satisfies the Evolutionary Stable Strategy conditions for the ideal equilibrium E8, namely Strong Regulation, Active Cooperation, and Active Ecological Integration. The results show that the system can converge to E8 when higher-level rewards cover government regulation, subsidy, and community-support costs; when community cooperation benefits exceed livelihood opportunity costs and compensation incentives from resistance; and when enterprises’ effective ecological integration costs are lower than the combined benefits of subsidies, avoided fines, and long-term returns. Sensitivity analysis further indicates that government subsidies, fines, community support, cooperation income, and enterprise long-term benefits are key drivers of system evolution, while excessive regulation costs, high opportunity costs, and high ecological integration costs may hinder coordination. Qualitative evidence from four PVDC-related cases in Xinjiang provides practical illustrations broadly consistent with the model mechanisms. This study offers a dynamic analytical framework for designing incentive-compatible governance mechanisms in PVDC and similar multi-stakeholder ecological restoration projects.