Green Recycling Decisions for End-of-Life Photovoltaic Modules Under Government Reward and Penalty Policies

Recycling end-of-life (EoL) photovoltaic (PV) modules is essential for resource recovery and pollution mitigation, yet weak incentives and non-standardized treatment continue to hinder the development of formal recycling systems. This paper develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, PV power generators, and third-party recyclers under a reward–penalty policy mechanism. Replicator dynamic equations, Jacobian stability analysis, and MATLAB R2023b (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) simulations are used to examine strategic interactions and evolutionary paths. The results show that: (1) under the baseline parameter setting, the system converges to a unique evolutionary stable strategy, (0, 1, 1), namely no government regulation, generator recycling, and recycler green technology innovation; (2) variations in initial strategy probabilities affect convergence speed but do not change the final equilibrium; (3) under the same total reward expenditure, increasing rewards to generators drives the system toward the desirable equilibrium faster than allocating the same amount mainly to recyclers; and (4) penalty policies also promote compliance, but their marginal effect is weaker than that of reward-based incentives. These findings suggest that appropriately designed incentives can accelerate generator recycling and recycler green innovation, while the government’s role may gradually shift from direct intervention to supervision and coordination.