Provably Secure and Lightweight Authentication Protocol for Smart Microgrids

Because smart microgrids can flexibly integrate distributed energy resources and support grid-connected and islanded operation modes, they enhance power supply reliability and promote the efficient utilization of renewable energy. However, the open communication environment and physically exposed infrastructure introduce critical security challenges, including risks of physical hijacking and data leakage. Many existing authentication protocols either fail to address these threats or rely on heavyweight cryptographic operations such as bilinear pairings and modular exponentiation, resulting in high computational and communicational overhead. To address these issues, a lightweight authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol for smart microgrids is proposed. The protocol symmetrically integrates Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) into the smart meter (SM) and smart microgrid control center (SMC) to protect stored secret information against capture attacks. Meanwhile, the SM and SMC register with the data center (DC) in a symmetric manner. During the AKA phase, the DC only assists in authenticating the identities of the SM and SMC online in a symmetric way, without participating in session key computation, thereby reducing the trust burden and computational load on the smart meters and control center. Formal security proof and informal security analysis demonstrate that the proposed protocol can resist known attacks such as physical hijacking and data leakage. Compared with existing smart microgrid authentication protocols, the proposed protocol has performance advantages and the lowest computational cost, confirming its suitability for resource-constrained microgrid environments.