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Smart meters and resource-constrained IoT devices must authenticate to utility service providers over public networks, yet many authentication and key agreement (AKA) schemes rely on costly bilinear pairings or large-modulus exponentiation, expose the meter identity, or are supported only by informal arguments. This paper proposes a pairing-free, two-message AKA protocol for smart-grid communication using elliptic curve cryptography. A trusted authority provisions escrow-free, implicitly certified key pairs once; afterwards, meter and provider authenticate each other and agree on a session key without trusted-authority involvement. The meter identity is hidden under a static–ephemeral Diffie–Hellman mask, a timestamp bound into the mask defeats replay, and three of the four scalar multiplications of the meter do not depend on the provider’s reply and can be precomputed offline. Security is established by a game-based proof in the Real-or-Random model under the Computational Diffie–Hellman assumption, by BAN-logic reasoning, by automated ProVerif verification that includes long-term key leakage, and by an explicit attack-scenario analysis. With operation costs commonly used in the literature, the meter-side cost is 4TE + 5TH (about 525 ms on a smart card), of which only about 134 ms must be spent online, a 74% reduction in authentication latency; on an identical software platform, the meter-side cost is the lowest among the seven compared schemes. A reference implementation completed 1000 of 1000 sessions correctly, rejected every replay, tampering and impersonation attempt, and served about 937 authentications per second on two processor cores with linear scaling up to 10,000 m, while consuming about 13 mJ per authentication at the meter. The protocol thus provides anonymity, perfect forward secrecy and key-compromise-impersonation resilience at a cost comparable to that of lighter but weaker schemes, and it reuses the P-256 and SHA-256 primitives already specified by DLMS/COSEM security suite 1, which eases deployment in advanced metering infrastructure.
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Sehhati et al. (2026) studied this question.
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