Deliberative capability republicanism : a theory of political authority

Philosophical Anarchism has imposed substantial challenges against defenders of political obligation and, relatedly, to theories of political authority in recent years. This thesis attempts to develop a normative democratic theory from the perspective of freedom. By reviewing the notion of negative freedom as non-interference, it argues that the individualistic nature of negative freedom contributes indirectly to the position of philosophical anarchism. Negative freedom wrongly conceives of freedom as conceptually prior to the existence of any legal and political structures, thereby facing the problem of democracy (no conceptual relation between freedom and democracy) and the problem of substantive judgment (the impossibility of maintaining a value-neutral notion of freedom). Republican freedom as non-domination, on the other hand, recognises the interrelation between individuals and the conceptual relation between freedom and the law, thereby avoiding the problem of democracy. It is in this sense better equipped as a foundational conception of freedom for a theory of political authority against philosophical anarchism. Nevertheless, it still faces the problem of substantive judgment. Without making substantive judgments, it fails to recognise that unfreedom can happen without intentional agential domination. It therefore cannot firmly explain the necessity of the state's existence or fully address the challenges posed by philosophical anarchism. The thesis then develops a capability-republican notion of freedom by integrating insights from the capabilities approach and republicanism. From the capabilities approach, it recognises the interdependency, diversity, and vulnerability of individual human beings, thereby making the case for the necessity of having a state. The state is necessary for the robust provision of basic capabilities to ensure that individuals live a genuinely free human life. It then develops Deliberative Capability Republicanism (DCR) as a theory of political authority, arguing that a government with normative political authority must be non-dominating, capability-securing, and deliberatively accountable to ensure citizens’ capability-republican freedom.