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Kathleen Hall Jamieson’s latest work could not be more timely. Actually, one wishes her painstaking account of “What We Don’t, Can’t, and Do Know” about the role of Russian disinformation in the 2016 election could have come even sooner. One hopes even more earnestly that everyone who studies presidential elections, everyone who safeguards their security, and particularly every journalist who covers them will heed this book. Of its many insights, one of the main contributions of Cyberwar is its carefully chosen title. What happened in 2016, Jamieson argues—and what shows every sign of happening again—should not be reduced to “meddling,” as news accounts typically have done. Framing Russia’s interference as cyberwar “defines hacking, posting, impersonating, and strategic release of stolen content as weaponry; presupposes agents with ill intent; invites us to see the perpetrators as enemies; casts hackers and trolls as soldiers, saboteurs, and spies…and implies the value of inviting the public to arm itself” (p. 8). This act of war has not been widely recognized for what it is, in large part because its effects have been obscured—not only by being framed as mere “meddling,” but also because the hackers’ and trolls’ multipronged effort exerted complex and hard-to-trace effects on the election’s outcome.
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Regina G. Lawrence (2019) studied this question.
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