Compromised Labor Rights and Regime Legitimacy Under Authoritarianism

How do citizens in authoritarian regimes respond when state promises go unfulfilled? In many such regimes, leaders enact prolabor legislation to signal responsiveness, yet enforcement often falls short in practice. This research note provides the first experimental evidence regarding how enforcement gaps in prolabor legislation shape mass political attitudes under authoritarian rule. Drawing on a preregistered survey experiment in China, I show that the absence of enforcement significantly erodes political support: Unmet expectations surrounding labor rights produce a measurable decline in trust in government. Partial enforcement, in contrast, generates markedly less negative public reactions—an effect that seems to be driven by the perceived material benefits associated with this enforcement. A follow-up study incorporating a list experiment to detect preference falsification replicates the core findings. By examining mass reactions to varying levels of labor rights enforcement in authoritarian contexts, this study advances our understanding of authoritarian legitimation strategies and clarifies the conditions under which cooptation can sustain public support.