From constitutional commitment to weak enforcement: explaining regulatory capacity gaps in post-war labor governance

In some post-war and transitional governance contexts, constitutional frameworks provide extensive labor rights protections while enforcement institutions face significant implementation challenges. This paper examines how regulatory capacity constraints shape the gap between constitutional labor rights and their implementation in post-war governance systems. Using Kosovo as a case study, the study analyzes the relationship between constitutional commitments, labor legislation, and enforcement institutions. Methodologically, it adopts a qualitative legal-institutional approach, combining doctrinal analysis of constitutional and statutory provisions with an institutional assessment of the labor inspection system and recent reform efforts. The findings identify four mechanisms that generate persistent enforcement gaps: 1. constitutional labor rights articulate broad normative commitments without corresponding operational mechanisms; 2. labor regulation is fragmented across multiple legal instruments and institutions; 3. enforcement capacity remains limited, particularly in inspection resources, coordination, and follow-up; and 4. recent inspection reforms improve procedural efficiency but fail to address structural constraints specific to labor law enforcement. The study contributes to socio-legal and governance scholarship by demonstrating that regulatory capacity constraints are central to understanding why strong formal labor rights may remain weakly implemented in certain post-war contexts. It advances a regulatory capacity perspective that explains the gap between constitutional commitments and practical enforcement.