Failed great power war and the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan

This paper addresses the following question: why has the Soviet Union, a superpower, suffered defeat against the apparently weaker and smaller forces of the Afghan guerrillas and been compelled to withdraw? In searching for answers the author employs the comparative method of foreign policy analysis, examines some similar conflicts of the past, and develops a set of interpretive propositions to explain major power defeat in Afghanistan‐type wars. The conclusion reached is that in a bi‐or multipolar system, as distinct from a hegemonic one, a great power cannot insulate a protracted war and manage it independently. Soviet progress in Afghanistan has been countered by American assistance on the resistance side. Armed by the United States, the resistance has imposed an unwinnable guerrilla war on the Soviets. Hence the Soviet withdrawal. In the absence of systemic bi‐ to multipolarity, the Soviet invasion would probably have succeeded.