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Contemporary Psychotherapy and the Medical Model: Response to “Thinking About Our Work: What Do We Mean by ‘Mental Health’?” Chris Scott1 issn 0362-4021 © 2017 Eastern Group Psychotherapy Society group, Vol. 41, No. 2, Summer 2017 163 1 Faculty member, Couple Therapy Training Program, Training Institute for Mental Health, New York, and Senior Partner, Village Counseling Center. Correspondence should be addressed to Chris Scott, LCSW, CGP, 345 Seventh Ave., Suite 1201, New York, NY 10001. E-mail: chris@ empathyworks.org. As psychotherapy practitioners, we each approach our work with a fairly definitive idea of what it is we are trying to do to help our patients or clients. We are change agents, each employing his or her version of an ameliorative, healing, or growthinducing process. Typically, treatment focuses on emotional reactions, responses, and behaviors that the client or patient wants to change to make his or her life better (Livingston & Scott, in press). If we approach this growth/change process primarily through the lens of the medical model and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–V; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), with its elaborate system of symptom classifications and pathology descriptors, aren’t we putting the client or patient under a microscope and turning him or her into an object for examination and emotional dissection? Isn’t applying diagnostic labels to the patient dehumanizing and a form of objectification, which may well have been the initial source of the patient’s issues or problems, and therefore does it not risk retraumatization? My question is, How does the application of DSM–V labels facilitate growth and change? The answer is that it does not; but then, what does? In House of Cards, Robyn Dawes (1994), a renowned academic psychologist, described his attempt to prove that psychotherapy was built on myth, as he challenged efficacy claims of verbal therapy. In the end, however, he made this proclamation: “I had become a reformed sinner, someone who had originally been ready to ascribe 164 scott the apparent effectiveness of psychotherapy to methodological flaws in the studies supporting it but who had now become a true believer” (p. 54). And much to the chagrin of most practitioners (me included), Dawes found no positive correlation between therapeutic efficacy and the therapist’s credentials or experience level. He did, however, locate a common denominator for therapeutic efficacy, which was empathy; he bluntly concluded, “If verbal therapy is sought, find someone empathic” (p. 74). To the students of Carl Rogers and Heinz Kohut, this is not a startling revelation . Both Kohut’s self psychology and Rogerian humanistic therapy proffered that empathy, unconditional positive regard, and positive mirroring are necessary to foster an effective growth or change process. For this reason, I maintain that reliance on the DSM–V and the medical model in psychotherapy without a strong commitment to empathy and pathos may actually do more harm than good. To understand why the DSM–V and the medical model are so dominant in psychotherapy today, we must look at the reality of the economic dynamics of the psychotherapy marketplace, including its inherent potential conflicts of interest. Typically, there are three players in the psychotherapy marketplace: (a) the client, (b) the therapist, and (c) the third-party payer (the insurance company). The client or patient seeks help from the therapist, and the therapist offers that help. Although I think we can agree that both of these parties want the same thing, which is for the patient’s condition to improve, there also is a potential conflict of interest here. Providing the therapeutic service is how the therapist earns a living, the therapist is economically dependent on clients needing and seeking help. In turn, the patient often becomes emotionally dependent on the therapist. These potential dependencies can be the unconscious drivers of treatment durations and outcomes, a point that is not lost on the third player, the insurance company. Although this player also wants the patient to get better, it too has a glaring potential conflict of interest— profitability. Simply stated, if treatment utilization patterns exceed the statistical/ actuarial assumptions used by the insurance company in determining the premiums charged for the coverage, the insurance company loses money.
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